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INTRODUCTION
This paper is a reflection on the semiological tradition after Saussure. 
The focus here is cartographic. In 196 Jacques Bertin presented the 
semiology of graphics, which has had an extensive influence on cartog-
raphy. Bertin claimed graphics (diagrams, networks and maps) to be a 
monosemic sign system because graphics transcribe relationships that 
are previously defined in a data table. This premise is critically revisited 
regarding maps, resulting in the conclusion that diagrams and networks 
might be monosemic representations while statistical maps cannot. 
Polysemy is introduced in statistical mapping because the plan pos-
sesses influencing properties on the transcribed meaning, which are not 
a priori defined in the data table. 
here are two dominant semiological traditions, one European, influ-
enced by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857 – 1913), called semiology and 
one North American influenced by C.S. Peirce (1839 – 1914), called semi-
otics. Semiology and semiotics are notions generally used by French and 
Anglo-American writers respectively, but they refer to the same discipline: 
the general study of signs. ‘The Peircean tradition has provided the most 
elaborate analysis of the typology of signs and how they “stand-for” their 
referents, while the Saussurean tradition has had a decisive influence on 
the semiotic theory of codes (i.e. the study of sign systems)’ (MacEachren, 
1995, 217-218). 
The two traditions differ in their general model of sign referred to as 
dyadic and triadic models, alluding to the number of elements identified 
in their sign relationships. In Saussure’s dyadic sign model the sign is 
the union of the two sides that constitute it: a concept and a sound-im-
age. Concept is a term leading into the semiotic dimension of semantics. 
Apparently, the term ‘concept’ closely corresponds to the more general 
semiotic terms meaning and content (Nöth, 1990, 61). Sound-image is a 
term that according to Saussure’s definition ‘is not the material sound, 
a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the 
impression that it makes in our senses’ (Saussure, 1974, 66). Saussure 
exemplified his sign model, as in figure 1.a, by illustrating the concept 
by the image of a ‘tree’ and the sound-image by the Latin word arbor 
(Saussure, 1974, 67). Later he decided to replace concept and sound-im-
age by signified and signifier respectively, since ‘the last two terms have 
the advantage of indicating the opposition that separated them from 
each other and from the whole of which they are parts’ (Saussure, 1974, 
67). Louis Hjelmslev developed the Saussurian dichotomy but used the 
notions content and expression. The fact that signified and signifier both 
are mental entities and independent of any external object in Saussure’s 
theory of the sign (Nöth, 1990, 60), is the most apparent difference from 
Peirce’s sign model (figure 1.b). In Peirce’s triadic model the referential 
object is included as a third category. From one of Peirce’s more elabo-
rate definitions, the three correlates of the sign are called: a representa-
men, an object and an interpretant (Nöth, 1990,42). The representamen 
is by other semioticians designated as the sign vehicle, the signifier, or 
the expression (Nöth, 1990, 42). Peirce’s second correlate of the sign, the 
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object, corresponds to the referent. This correlate can be a material “ob-
ject of the world”. It can be a “single known existing thing” or a class of 
things (Nöth, 1990, 42-43). Interpretant is Peirce’s term for the meaning 
of a sign, the signs significance. 
Saussure called ‘the combination of a concept [signified] and a sound-im-
age [signifier] a sign, but in current usage the term generally designates 
only a sound-image, a word, for example (arbor, etc.)’ (Saussure, 1974, 67 
– words in brackets are added). When Bertin defined graphics (1983, 2), 
he stated that the meanings which we attribute to signs can be monosemic 
or polysemic. The term sign used by Bertin seems not to correspond with 
Saussure’s ‘sign’ but with Saussure’s ‘signifier’. When Bertin uses the term 
sign, he often does so in the context of polysemy. Similar to how Bertin ex-
cludes the notion of code (as will be shown later) he seems to exclude the 
notion of sign, probably because he coins both terms as associated with 
polysemic sign systems. ‘Mathematics and graphics exclude polysemic 
signs, by only considering relationships among previously defined ele-
ments’ (Bertin, 1981, 179). In order to transcribe these relationships, signs 
were not needed.
The transcription of relationships does not utilize “signs”; it utilizes 
only the relationship between signs. It utilizes visual variations. Graphics 
denotes a resemblance between two things by a visual resemblance 
between two signs, the order of three things by the order of three signs 
(Bertin, 1981, 177 – originally emphasis).
The relationships to be transcribed are resemblance, order and propor-
tion (Bertin, 1978, 118-119; 1980, 592-593). Without making any reference, 
Bertin uses the Saussurian terminology and calls the three relationships 
the three signifieds (Bertin, 1981, 177). Graphics utilizes visual variations 
between visible marks. This variation has eight variables to its disposal 
(Bertin, 1983, 7): the dimensions of the plane (variation in x and y loca-
tion), shape, orientation, color, texture, value, and size. Although Bertin 
does not explicitly indicate that he takes Saussure’s ideas as a basis for his 
own research, this article will interpret Bertin’s synthesis along Saussurean 
lines. I will call the combination of the three relationships as the signifieds 
(or contents), and the relationships between visual variations as the signi-
fiers (or expressions) of a graphic sign.
THE GRAPHIC SEMIOLOGY
Figure 1. The dyadic sign model (a) adapted from Saussure (1974,67) and the triadic sign model (b) after Peirce. Peirce did not himself 
make any graphic illustration on his sign model – this one is adapted from Eco (1976,59).
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Most cartographers accept the contention that there is a limited set of 
graphic primitives available for cartographic representation. Some author, 
however, have found Bertin’s graphic semiology incomplete and subse-
quently extended the visual variable syntactics slightly (Morrison, 1974, 
124 and MacEachren, 1994, 33).  As Bertin’s graphic semiology is closely 
tied to static classes of representation (point, line, or area), its syntactics 
is tried extended to also cover 2 ½ and 3 dimensional representations 
(Slocum, 1999, 23). A dynamic variable syntactics is suggested in order to 
cover dynamic mapping (MacEachren, 1995, 288). This article is an inter-
pretation and modification to Bertin’s original ideas and does thus not 
include an extended syntactics. The problem that polysemy is introduced 
in mapping should be of relevance for both static and dynamic maps.
As many of his contemporaries and predecessors (i.e. Robinson, 1952), 
Bertin tried to distance graphics (diagrams, networks, and maps) from art. 
Several writers have written about the science/art polarity and its rel-
evance for cartography (for instance Krygier, 1995 and Keates, 1996), but 
little attention is directed towards how the traditional science/art polarity 
corresponds to monosemic versus polysemic sign systems. ‘A system is 
monosemic when the meaning of each sign is known prior to observa-
tion of the collection of signs’. By contrast ‘a system is polysemic when 
the meaning of the individual sign follows and is deduced from con-
sideration of the collection of signs’ (Bertin, 1983, 2 - original emphasis). 
Thus, according to Bertin, graphics are monosemic. Graphics ‘is an image 
that transcribes relations between elements or groups of elements (sets) 
previously definite’ (Bertin, 1978, 121). The elements or sets might be, for 
instance, two factories.
 
How do we represent a factory? There is an infinite number of “good” 
representations. The choice is an art. That is pictography. Factory A 
employs twice as many workers as factory B. There is only one single 
representation: show that A is twice as large as B. This is not an art 
since there is no choice. This is graphics (Bertin, 1981, 177-178).
Since ‘a graphic always begins with a data table’ (Bertin, 1978, 121) 
the relationships between these elements are previously defined, as for 
instance factory ‘A’ employs twice as many as factory ‘B’ (figure 2.a). In a 
monosemic sign system, there is a consistency in meaning like for in-
stance: twice as large: twice as much (see figure 2.b). Size signifies quan-
tity; variation in size signifies variation in quantities. 
This constituted, Bertin claimed, a monosemic sign system. To em-
ploy a monosemic system means that ‘for a certain domain and during 
a certain time, all the participants come to agree on certain meanings 
expressed by certain signs, and agree to discuss them 
no further’ (Bertin, 1983, 3 - original emphasis). Fol-
lowing Guiraud (1975, 25), the more the relation 
between the signifier and the signified are precise 
and widely recognized, the more the sign con-
forms to a monosemic sign system. Anyone should 
be able to evaluate the relationships between the 
marks displayed in figure 3 with a certain degree 
of accuracy. 
A square filled with diagonal lines differs from a 
square filled with lines having another orientation. 
We recognize difference in resemblance. A light 
gray square differs from a dark gray square. We 
THE MONOSEMIC GRAPHICS
Figure 2. In a data table (a), the relationships between the elements are previ-
ously defined. A graphic (b) is monosemic since it transcribes relations between 
elements previously defined.
“Most cartographers accept the 
contention that there is a
limited set of graphic
primitives available for
cartographic representation.”
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THE GRAPHIC CODE
recognize difference in resemblance and order. A small box differs from 
a twofold large box. We recognize difference in resemblance, order, and 
proportion. 
Figure 3. Visual variation between marks and the evaluated relationships.
Bertin emphasizes the way a monosemic versus a polysemic representa-
tion is perceived. ‘The attention we pay to a diagram or to a map is differ-
ent from that paid to a painting, a poster or a traffic signal’ (Bertin, 1978, 
120). To perceive a polysemic representation requires only one phase of 
perception: what is it about? The aim of a polysemic representation is to 
define a set or a concept (Bertin, 1981, 176). To perceive a polysemic rep-
resentation involves the identification of a few concepts from among the 
unlimited number of imaginable ones. In order to characterize polysemic 
communication, Bertin (1978, 118) used the schema: sender
code        receiver (Bertin, 1980, 593), which he had reduced from Shannon 
and Weaver (1949, 7) and Schramm and Roberts (1971, 23). This schema in 
its various forms was popular in numerous studies of maps as the me-
dium for cartographic communication where the encoding of the message 
(the map making) and its decoding (the map reading) were analyzed. ‘The 
map is the coded “message”’ (Robinson and Petchenik, 1976, 27).
‘The aim of graphics is to make relationships among previously defined 
sets appear’ (Bertin, 1981, 176 - original emphasis). ‘One can than ascertain 
that any diagram (and consequently any cartography) is or can be consid-
ered as the transcription of a data table’ (Bertin, 1978, 121). To perceive a 
graphic requires two distinct phases of perception (Bertin, 1981, 177). ‘The 
first time of perception in ‘the graphics’ consists in recognizing the three 
components of this data table’ (Bertin, 1978, 121). The three components 
(Bertin calls them x, y, and z) are the variables (i.e. ‘employed’), the units 
(i.e. factory ‘A’ and ‘B’), and the units’ values (i.e. ‘300’ and ‘150’). In the 
second phase of perception, the graphic answers questions dealing ‘with 
the relationships existing between the components x, y and z in the data 
table’ (Bertin, 1978, 123), for instance: factory ‘A’ employs twice as many 
workers as factory ‘B’. The author and the reader are in exactly the same 
situation. They are the “actors” who ask the questions in the second phase 
of perception. According to Bertin, their perception follows the monos-
↔
↔
“To perceive a polysemic
representation requires only
one phase of perception: what
is it about?”
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emic schema: actor         three relationships. According to Bertin, the percep-
tion of the graphics does not need any code. ‘The reader needs no code to 
“see” order or proportion’ (Bertin, 1978, 123). 
The term code has two meanings rooted in two quite opposed domains: 
the secret sphere of cryptography and the public sphere of laws (Nöth, 
1990, 206). The introduction of the term in semiotics had a terminologi-
cal “landslide effect” (Eco, 1984, 166). Only few scholars adhered to the 
nar-rower definition of code as a correlational device, as mere instructions 
for the translation of signs from one system of signs to another. Mostly, the 
term became a synonym of sign system. To which of these definitions Ber-
tin coined the term is difficult to say. Schlichtmann (1979, 81) and Board 
(1981, 61) pointed out that Bertin referred to graphic representation as a 
code in the form of a sign system, but he never explicitly defined the code. 
Normally, it is within semiotic theory defined as a set of rules for linking 
expression and contents (Eco, 1976, 36-37), as a correspondence between 
signifiers and signifieds (Wood and Fels, 1986, 68). Consequently, for semi-
ology of graphics, a code is the set of rules for linking the visual vari-ation 
and the three relationships. Thus as Board concluded: ‘Bertin’s rules do 
form part of what might well be regarded as a code’ (Board, 1981, 61). 
It follows from the example in figure 3 that different visual variables 
have different signifying properties. They signify one or more of the 
relationships of resemblance, order, and proportion. The relationship 
of resemblance consists of associative and selective properties. A visual 
variable is associative when it creates an equalized image like in figure 
4.a and 4.b. Shape and orientation 
are associative variables since they 
do not cause the visibility of the 
signs to vary. 
‘Selective perception is utilized 
in obtaining an answer to the ques-
tion: “Where is a given category?”’ 
(Bertin, 1983, 67). It seems that ori-
entation (4.b), value (4.c), and size 
(4.d) are selective while shape (4.a) 
is not. The use of value and size, 
however, construct a visual hierar-
chy favoring the reactor and coal 
characteristics. Value and size are 
thus dissociative (not associative) 
since they cause the visibility of the 
signs to vary. According to Bertin 
(1981, 213) this hierarchy is an error 
when unjustified, as, for example, 
when used to differentiate among 
characteristics. ‘When the character-
istics are quantitative, size and/or 
value are used to represent the 
quantities (or their order)’ (Bertin, 
1981, 213 – originally emphasis). 
Figure 5 summarizes the properties 
of the visual variables identified by 
Bertin. 
Bertin grouped the visual vari-
ables into two main classes, the 
dimensions of the plane and the 
SIGNIFYING PROPERTIES
Figure 4. Associative (a, b), selective (b, c, d), and dissociative (c, d) signifying properties.
↔
“The term code has two
meanings rooted in two quite 
opposed domains: the secret 
sphere of cryptography and the 
public sphere of laws.” 
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Figure 6. Lines and areas as individual localized signs.
Figure 5. The properties of the visual variables (Adapted from Berlin, 1981, 231).
cartographic perspectives    
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retinal variables. In cartographic theory, the properties of the latter have 
achieved most attention. The properties of the former have more or less 
been overlooked, although ‘the plane provides the only variables possessing 
all four perceptual properties’ (Bertin, 1983, 49), that is: associative, selective, 
ordered, and quantitative. In order to “prove” that a variation in position 
is ordered and that difference in position is quantitative, Bertin used an 
example with three line segments as in figure 6.a (Bertin, 1983, 49). 
Bertin claimed that anyone could evaluate the relationships displayed 
in figure 6.a with a certain degree of accuracy: 
A > C > B A = 2C  B = C/2 
Bertin continued with stating that the plan permits us to add segments 
(Bertin, 1983, 49). Areas and lines are aggregates of points. Schlichtmann 
(1991, 265) treats space (points or aggregates of points like lines and areas) 
as individual localized signs, isolated by a notional (content-related) crite-
rion (example: ‘country’) and a graphic (expression-related) criterion (ex-
ample: area symbols which indicate a country). Similar to Bertin’s example 
above, anyone should be able to evaluate the relationships displayed in 
figure 6.b with a certain degree of accuracy: 
A > C > B A = 2C  B = C/2
In this article, I adopt Schlichtmann’s term ‘locational signs’ which I 
will use for the administrative units used for statistical mapping.
The diagram in figure 7.a shows two components: (1) quantities in thou-
sands of salaried workers, according to (2) five ‘départements’ in Brittany. 
When constructing a diagram that depicts numerical information, like 
the one in figure 7.a, one does not need the retinal variables in order to 
transcribe quantities since one dimension covers the categories (the x-axis) 
and one dimension covers the quantities (the y-axis). Figure 7.b represent 
a different situation. ‘In cartography, the geographic component occupies 
the two planar dimensions’ (Bertin, 1983, 58). Consequently, ‘we must seek 
new variables to represent additional components. These are the “elevat-
ed” or “retinal” variables’ (Bertin, 1983, 59). 
Figure 7.b is an example of visual variation “above” the plane. The base 
map composes the two dimensions of the plane. In order to represent a 
previously defined relationship, it is the variables of the third dimension 
or the ‘retinal’ variables that need to be called upon. It is a relationship 
of proportions; thus, the visual variable size must be used for its repre-
sentation. The ‘retinal’ variable size is inscribed “above” the plane and is, 
according to Bertin, independent from it - independent in the sense that 
the eye can perceive its variation without requiring movement. Eye move-
ment occurs when the map perceiver needs to scan or read the map in 
order to conceive the overall meaning (Bertin, 1983, 62-63). Bertin claims 
that the transcription of meaning (relationship of resemblance, order, or 
proportions), is left to the ‘retinal variables’ alone. 
To claim that the transcription of meaning is left to the ‘retinal vari-
ables’ alone is a pronouncement I find difficult to accept. I believe that 
the properties of the plan exert influence on how maps are imbued with 
meaning. The size of the administrative units to which the marks corre-
spond, make up additionally signs – localized signs. Consequently, in a 
comparison of two graphic depictions, there are three relations that need 
to be considered (see figure 8). 
First, it is the visual variation “above” the plan, which generate the 
denotative code (1). Second, ‘what people see when confronted with pro-
portional symbols related to areas is a ratio between the size of the symbol 
and the size of the enumeration area it refers to’ (Kraak and Ormeling, 
1996, 135). This generates an interlocking code (2). Third, to say that 
SUPERIMPOSING LEVELS OF 
MEANING
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‘space is utilized to signify space’ (Bertin, 1983, 58) is too simple. As the 
administrative units differ in size, the size variation transcribes additional 
relationships of resemblance, order, and proportion. This generates a su-
perimposed code (3). In this article, only the denotative and superimposed 
codes are subject for investigation.
The meaning transcribed by the ‘retinal variables’ alone, is a deno-
tative semiotic (see figure 9). ‘In a denotative semiotic an expression 
plane denotes a content plane’ (Eco, 1994, 182). Eco uses as Saussure a 
dyadic sign model, but exchanged, 
like Hjelmslev did, the terms signified 
and signifier by content and expres-
sion respectively. Schlichtmann (1979, 
1985, 1991) adopts the same termi-
nology. The content of map entries, 
he outlines, have both plan-free and 
plan components. ‘Items of plan 
information are denoted, i.e. directly 
expressed, by plan characteristics of 
symbols’ (Schlichtmann, 1985, 24). 
Plan information is also connoted 
(Schlichtmann, 1985, 29 – footnote 
11). In connotative semiotic ‘both 
expression and content of a denotative 
semiotic become in turn the expression 
plane of a new content plane’ (Eco, 
1994, 182). Connotation is a mediated 
meaning, i.e., a meaning released by 
another more basic meaning (Schlich-
tmann, 1990, note 3, Eco, 1976, 55-56). 
The basic meaning in figure 9.c is that 
Figure 7. When the various categories are spatially defined and the information produces a map, both dimensions are utilized for their repre-
sentation. The representation of quantities must be transcribed by “elevated” or “retinal” variables (Bertin, 1983, 58-59).
Figure 8. Denotative code (1), interlocked code (2), and superimposed code (3).
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‘space is utilized to signify space’ (Bertin, 1983, 58). ‘Whatever else the 
map may do, in any case it represent a space, and it represents by means 
of a space’ (Schlichtmann, 1985, 24). As shown in figure 9, areas and thus 
base map units possess signifying properties, which mediate an addi-
tional meaning. Inconsistency might arrive in the transcribed meaning if 
the denoted meaning, for instance twice as large: twice as much (A = 2B) 
differs from the connoted one (6A = B).
Probably the only situation in mapping where the graphic message 
would depend on the ‘retinal variables’ alone is when the size and form of 
the area patches is equal and aligned regularly like in figure 10. In nearly 
Figure 9. Denotative and connotative semiotic when the administrative units varies in size.
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Figure 10. Denotative and connotative semiotic for aligned grid cells.
all situations in statistical mapping, however, administrative units vary in 
size as in figure 9 (for simplicity ignore that the area patches also differ in 
shape). If the size and form vary too much between administrative units, 
a biased picture of the statistical theme might occur. The graphic message 
does thus not depend on the ‘retinal variables’ alone. The problem under 
discussion has been well recognized in empirical research on statistical 
mapping (Dykes, 1994:105). In this article, the problem has been tackled in 
a theoretical context.
Guiraud (1975, 27-28) stated for articulated language that polysemic 
meaning emerges since one is dealing not so much with one code as with 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
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